

Research report: Finding measures to manage increased migration because of climate change as well as building support programs for affected nations

Climate change is rapidly changing the conditions of our world. The changes to our global temperature, which are currently estimated to be of around 1.35 °C, are only expected to increase by 0.20° C per decade due to the human-generated greenhouse gases.¹ These changes to the global climate lead to increased amounts of extreme weather events, such as droughts, wildfires, floods, etc. and environmental degradation through rising sea levels or soil salinisation, leading to displacement of people, also known as **climate migration**.² Especially developing countries are affected by these changes, as they do not have the resources to combat the changes.³

Current situation on climate migration

Most of the current climate migrations happen in the form of IDP's (internal displacement's), where migrants move within a country, rather than international immigration, with 7.7 million people living in IDP's because of disasters according to a 2024 statistic. The countries with most people living in IDP's in 2024 were Afghanistan (1.5 million), Pakistan (1.2 million) and China (881 thousand).⁴ Current projections for climate migrants by the year 2050 range from anywhere from 25 million to 1.2 billion.⁵

Although international climate migrants are a lot rarer and there are few statistics on them, they already exist through treaties such as the Falepili Union Treaty, which would allow 280 Tuvaluans to migrate permanently to Australia due to rising sea levels.⁶

¹ <https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-global-temperature> (accessed 14.9.2025)

² <https://science.nasa.gov/climate-change/extreme-weather/> (accessed 14.9.2025)

³ <https://www.bmz.de/en/issues/climate-change-and-development/migration-and-climate> (accessed 14.9.2025)

⁴ https://www.migrationdataportal.org/international-data?t=2023&i=idp_stock_disaster (accessed 14.9.2025)

⁵ <https://www.unicef.org.uk/policy/climate-migration-and-education/> (accessed 14.9.2025)

⁶ <https://www.wired.com/story/the-first-planned-migration-of-an-entire-country-is-underway/#:~:text=Caption%20Options,25%2C%20the%20high%20commission%20says>. (accessed 14.9.2025)

Current measures to manage climate migration

Current measures to combat climate change are heavily limited as no legal frameworks in place (with the exception of the Kampala convention), with some countries, such as the USA, not even recognizing climate refugees. While countries such as Kiribati and Tuvalu push for development in this regard the term **climate refugee** has no legal framework and political pressure around the world against refugees.⁷ In addition to that there are concerns on state sovereignty and how much other states are allowed to intervene with impacted countries, along with financial and definition problems.⁸

Proposed measures to manage climate migration

The World Economic Forum has proposed 4 measures to prevent and manage climate migration. They proposed improving vulnerability mapping, especially in poor regions where they do not have the resources to do it themselves in order to implement early warning systems. In addition to that monetary support be sent within a timely manner to prevent hunger within refugee communities. To ensure that once a climate disaster happens that the refugees have a place to go, they propose long term relocation plans for vulnerable regions.⁹

International Legal and Policy Framework

The international approach to climate displacement is managed through a collection of different frameworks, rather than a single binding treaty. This has created a significant legal gap, as no current instrument offers a dedicated protection status for individuals crossing borders due to climate-related events.

- **The 1951 Refugee Convention:** The primary legal instrument for refugees, the 1951 Refugee Convention, is a major limitation as its definition of a refugee is strictly limited to people fleeing persecution. This means that the Convention does not legally recognize the term “climate refugee”, as environmental disasters are not considered a form of persecution under this framework.¹⁰

⁷ <https://www.humanrightsresearch.org/post/the-impact-of-far-right-parties-in-europe-on-eu-immigration-policy> (accessed 14.9.2025)

⁸ <https://climate.sustainability-directory.com/question/what-international-agreements-address-climate-displacement/> (accessed 14.9.2025)

⁹ <https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/03/4-ways-to-prevent-and-manage-climate-migration/> (accessed 14.9.2025)

¹⁰ [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698753/EPRS_BRI\(2021\)698753_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698753/EPRS_BRI(2021)698753_EN.pdf) (accessed 14.9.2025)

- **The UNFCCC and The Paris Agreement:** While the Paris Agreement is the central framework for climate action, it does not offer direct protection status. Instead, it acknowledges the issue through the establishment of the **Task Force on Displacement**, which is mandated to develop recommendations to avert, minimize and address displacement related to climate change.¹¹
- **The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM):** A more recent development is the Global Compact for Migration, which is the first UN agreement to address the issue. Although it is non-binding, its **Objective 5** is significant as it calls on states to enhance migration pathways, including creating visa options for people displaced by slow-onset environmental disasters.¹²
- **The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction:** This framework focuses on prevention rather than protection for those already displaced. Its main goal is to manage disaster risk by promoting measures such as early warning systems and resilient infrastructure, which are intended to prevent displacement from happening in the first place.¹³
- **The Kampala Convention:** At a regional level, the Kampala Convention in Africa stands out as a unique example. It is the world's only legally binding instrument that requires states to protect and assist Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), including those displaced by natural disasters. However, its scope is limited to internal displacement within the African continent.¹⁴

Key Viewpoints and Bloc Positions

The international debate on climate migration is characterized by distinct positions held by various negotiating blocs. These viewpoints are primarily shaped by a nation's vulnerability to climate impacts, its historical contribution to greenhouse gas emissions, and its economic capacity. The countries that are part of said Bloc will be added after the name of the Bloc in square brackets.

- **Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) [Fiji]:** For this bloc, climate migration is an immediate and existential threat. AOSIS nations advocate for the most ambitious mitigation targets to prevent displacement and are the strongest proponents of creating formal legal pathways for migration, sometimes referred to as "migration with dignity." They are also primary advocates for a fully funded

¹¹ <https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/task-force-displacement> (accessed 14.9.2025)

¹² <https://www.iom.int/global-compact-migration> (accessed 14.9.2025)

¹³ <https://www.undrr.org/implementing-sendai-framework/what-sendai-framework> (accessed 14.9.2025)

¹⁴ <https://au.int/en/treaties/african-union-convention-protection-and-assistance-internally-displaced-persons-africa> (accessed 14.9.2025)

and easily accessible Loss and Damage Fund to address the unavoidable impacts, including relocation.¹⁵

- **Least Developed Countries (LDCs) Group** [*Bangladesh*]: The LDC Group prioritizes preventing displacement by focusing on adaptation and resilience-building at home. Their main demand is for a significant increase in grant-based climate finance (not loans) from developed countries to fund projects like early warning systems, climate-resilient agriculture, and infrastructure. They argue that a failure to provide this support will inevitably lead to mass displacement.¹⁶
- **Developed Countries** [*Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Republic of Korea, Russia, Sweden, UK, USA*]: These nations acknowledge climate change as a driver of migration but are cautious about creating new international legal obligations or a distinct "climate refugee" status. Their policy preference is to provide financial support for adaptation and disaster risk reduction in vulnerable countries, thereby managing migration at its source. They often emphasize the use of existing frameworks like the Global Compact for Migration rather than developing new binding treaties.¹⁷
- **The Group of 77 and China (G77 + China)** [*China, Argentina, Egypt, Kenya, South Africa, Turkey, UAE*]: As the largest bloc of developing countries, the G77 and China consistently frame the issue through the lens of climate justice and **Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR)**. They argue that developed nations have a historical responsibility to lead in emissions reductions and to provide the financial and technological support necessary for developing countries to manage climate impacts, including displacement. Their position is that a lack of sufficient and predictable climate finance is a primary cause of the migration crisis.¹⁸
- **Non-Government Organisation's (NGO's)** [*Greenpeace, Human Rights Watch*]: Non-governmental organizations are heavily involved in the climate migration debate, primarily advocating from a human rights and climate justice perspective. Human Rights Watch focuses on the legal obligations of states, urging for the creation of rights-based policies to manage climate-related relocation. They argue that governments must protect the human rights of people who are forced to move and ensure that any relocation process is done with community consultation and upholds the dignity of those displaced

¹⁵ <https://www.aosis.org/cop28-closing-plenary-aosis-statement-on-gst-decision/#:~:text=It%20does%20not%20deliver%20on,us%20beyond%20the%20status%20quo>. (accessed 14.9.2025)

¹⁶ <https://www ldc-climate.org/tag/cop28/> (accessed 14.9.2025)

¹⁷ [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698753/EPRS_BRI\(2021\)698753_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698753/EPRS_BRI(2021)698753_EN.pdf) (accessed 14.9.2025)

¹⁸ <https://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=231209> (accessed 14.9.2025)

(Human Rights Watch, 2025)¹⁹. Greenpeace frames the issue more directly as a matter of climate justice, contending that "climate refugees" are left without rights or a home due to a crisis they did not cause. They place the responsibility squarely on industrialized nations and the fossil fuel industry, arguing that the only lasting solution is to hold polluters accountable and rapidly phase out fossil fuels to prevent displacement from occurring (Greenpeace Germany, n.d.).²⁰

What now?

Now it is up to you delegates using your own research and the information and links provided within this document, to write your own position paper and prepare for AMUN 2025. To fruitful debates!

Your Chair,

Kyrill Galkin

¹⁹ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/06/25/new-global-coalition-urges-rights-based-climate-relocation-policies> (accessed 14.9.2025)

²⁰ <https://www.greenpeace.de/klimaschutz/klimakrise/klimafluechtlinge-recht-heimatlos> (accessed 14.9.2025)

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